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Abstract. This paper revisits the question of whether propositions in situation se-
mantics must be persistent Kratzer (1989). It shows that ignoring persistence causes
empirical problems to theories which use quantification over minimal situations as
a solution for donkey anaphora Elbourne (2005), while at the same time modifying
these theories to incorporate persistence makes them incompatible with the use of
situations for contextual restriction Kratzer (2004).
1. Introduction
Kratzer (1989) introduces a framework for situation semantics that
was taken as a starting point by a substantial body of later work.
One property of this framework is that what is true of a small situ-
ation must remain true of larger situations that it is a part of. This
is known as persistence. Kratzer’s argumentation for this condition,
however, is primarily of a conceptual nature. This led most of the work
which adopted her framework to overlook this condition, and neglect
to incorporate it into their theories.
In this paper, I will return to the issue of persistence, with several
goals in mind. First and foremost, I aim to show that the persistence
condition is not just motivated on conceptual grounds, but it is justified
empirically. While doing so, I will also explore some of the requirements
that are necessary for a proposition to be persistent. Finally, I shall
discuss the consequences of persistence to different lines of research in
situation semantics. Specifically, I will show that theories of donkey
anaphora that require quantification over minimally small situations
are in conflict with Kratzer’s (2004) theory of contextual restriction, as
the latter requires that quantification involve large situations in order
to ensure persistence.
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2. Persistent Propositions
Kratzer (1989) introduces a situation semantics which relies heavily on
the part-whole relationship of situations1. Situations, according to this
framework, are groupings of entities, their properties, and relations
between them. Reference to situations is handled through situation
variables, which can be quantified over just like other variables. Much
of the power of this framework is derived from the fact that situations
in this system are partially ordered by the sub-situation operator ≤.
If s ≤ s′, then s′ may contain at least one entity, property, or relation
that s does not. There is a maximal element to this ordering - the
possible world, which, naturally, includes all the entities, properties,
and relations that exist in that world. For brevity, I shall call a situation
s′ an extension of a situation s iff s ≤ s′ and s 6= s′.
In this system, a proposition is defined as a set of situations, such
that a proposition p is true in a situation s if s ∈ p. Nothing said so
far prevents a proposition from being true in a situation s, but false
in some extensions of it. For example, take the proposition p which is
expressed in (1):
(1) There are no living kings.
(1) is, under a straightforward analysis of its meaning, true of a situa-
tion s1 that includes only an individual x and the fact that x is alive.
However, there may be a larger situation s2 that includes x, the fact
that he lives, and the fact that he is a king. (1) is not true of s2. But
note that s1 ≤ s2.
As mentioned above, Kratzer (1989) takes the view that this is an
unwelcome result. She suggests that a condition be added such that all
natural-language propositions be persistent, following the definition
below:2.
(2) A persistent proposition is a proposition of which it is true
that, for every s such that s ∈ p, for every s′ such that s ≤ s′ it
holds that s′ ∈ p.
1 While Kratzer’s later work revises key aspects of this framework (see Kratzer,
2002 and Kratzer, 2005), the issues discussed in this paper remain constant through-
out the various iterations of this system, both those authored by Kratzer herself and
those adapted by other authors
2 Terminology due Barwise and Perry (1983). It is important to distinguish this
use of persistent from the use of the same term in Barwise and Cooper (1981), where
it is used to denote “right upwards monotone”.
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With this condition in place, then, in the world described above, s1
cannot be a member of the proposition expressed by (1), due to the
existence of s2.
It is important to note that Kratzer does not enforce this condition
by somehow filtering out non-persistent propositions. Rather, she pro-
vides denotations for quantifiers that encode persistence. For example,
instead of the non-persistent denotation for every provided in (3), she
suggests (4)3:
(3) Non-persistent quantification:JeveryK = λf〈〈se〉,〈st〉〉λg〈〈se〉,〈st〉〉λs. For all x〈e〉: if f(λs.x)(s) =
1, g(λs.x)(s) = 1
(4) Persistent quantification:JeveryK = λf〈〈se〉,〈st〉〉λg〈〈se〉,〈st〉〉λs. For all x〈e〉: if f(λs.x)(w) =
1, f(λs.x)(s) = 1 and g(λs.x)(s) = 1
The difference between the two quantifiers is as follows: in (3), the
quantifier is restricted to entities which have property f in s, and it
predicates of them that they also have property g. In (4), the quantifier
is restricted to all the fs in the world, and it states that they have that
property in s, as well as g. Thus, a proposition only holds of situations
that include all the fs in w, and in which all of them are also gs. Both
these properties will hold of every larger situation4.
While writing persistence into the determiner denotation ensures
that all sentences end up denoting persistent propositions, it also com-
plicates these denotations. Since Kratzer does not provide empirical
justification for doing so, most of the literature following her work chose
to use the simpler, non-persistent denotations5. The next section will
examine one such theory, and show why this choice leads to empirical
problems.
3 The denotations given below differ from Kratzer’s in their notation, as I use the
same formalism as Elbourne (2005). Nonetheless, the ideas are the same, with one
major simplification: Kratzer (1989) deals with some distinctions which go beyond
the scope of this paper, such as the distinction between propositions that are true
accidentally and propositions that are true by some inherent fact about the nature
of the world. I will ignore such distinctions here.
4 This is actually not entirely correct. Take the sentence Every professor owns an
even number of hats - there can be a situation s that includes all the professors, and
each of them has an even number of hats in that situation, but there’s a situation s′
in which one professor has an additional hat. I will ignore this issue in the discussion
that follows, since it will not carry over to the quantifier denotations that use minimal
situations.
5 For a discussion of persistence in non-Kratzarian situation theory, see Cooper
(1991)
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3. Minimal situations and donkey anaphora
3.1. The Heim/Elbourne solution for donkey anaphora
One recent promising use of situation semantics has been to solve a
problem that arises in the resolution of donkey anaphora. This line of
research was first suggested by Heim (1990), and elaborated in work
such as Elbourne (2005), von Fintel (2004, 1995) and Bu¨ring (2004).
In the following discussion I shall make reference directly only to El-
bourne’s theory; however, a similar point could be made with respect
to the other implementations.
Situation semantics become necessary because of an apparent prob-
lem for the E-type analysis (Evans, 1977, 1980) of donkey anaphora.
The E-type analysis is one of the most attractive explanations of this
phenomenon. In it, the donkey pronoun is taken to have semantics
similar to a definite description, such that (5) is interpreted as (6):
(5) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
(6) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats [the donkey].
However, there is a major problem with this solution: definite descrip-
tions require a unique referent. Such a referent does not seem to be
available in donkey anaphora; (5) can clearly be true in a context that
contains multiple donkeys (and in fact, if there was only a single donkey,
it would be hard to imagine (5) used with felicity).
The Heim/Elbourne solution relies on the insight that even if there is
more than one donkey involved in the overall world, situation semantics
allows us to access sub-situations of that world that contain only one
donkey. Thus, it is possible to make use of those situations to ensure
unique referents for the donkey pronouns.
All that needs to be done is to take care to only refer to situations
small enough to contain exactly one donkey. For this purpose, instead
of making reference to just any situations within the denotation of the
quantifiers, instead they are taken to quantify over minimal situa-
tions. A minimal situation such that p holds is a situation s ∈ p such
that there is no situation s′ ∈ p such that s′ ≤ s6.
For example, the following is Elbourne’s denotation for every :
(7) Minimal quantification:JeveryK = λf〈〈se〉,〈st〉〉λg〈〈se〉,〈st〉〉λs1. For all x〈e〉: for each minimal
situation s2 such that s2 ≤ s1 and f(λs.x)(s2) = 1, there is a
6 The use of minimal situations is not novel to Heim (1990) but comes from
Berman (1987). Heim, however, was the first to use minimal situations within the
context of an E-type solution.
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situation s3 such that s3 ≤ s1 and s3 is a minimal situation such
that s2 ≤ s3 and g(λs.x)(s3) = 1
Paraphrased informally, every quantifies not over individuals that have
a certain property (the NP restriction), but over sub-situations of its
argument situation that contain only the individual and said property.
For each of these situations, every claims that it is possible to extend
it in such a way that a second property (the VP denotation) holds true
of the individual7.
By adding this quantifier denotation to the E-type story, (5) can be
informally paraphrased as (8):
(8) Every situation can be divided up in such a way that for every
sub-situation that involves a farmer, a donkey he owns, and
nothing else, there is a situation that involves the farmer, the
donkey, the ownership, and the fact that the farmer beats the
unique donkey in that situation.
An example of such a situation can be seen in figure 1, where for each
of the minimal farmer/donkey situations s1, s2, and s3 there is an
extension s1′, s2′, and s3′ respectively wherein the farmer beats the
donkey.
own
beat
S1
S1'
own
beat
S2
S2'
own
beat
S3
S3'
Figure 1. Example of Elbournian situations
At first blush, this solves the problem, as, by virtue of being minimal,
the minimal situation will never contain more than than the single
donkey necessary to make the subject have the property of being a
farmer who owns a donkey. This donkey makes a good unique referent
7 It’s worth noting that this approach is not trivially generalized to cardinal
quantifiers such as three, as it is not clear how to count minimal situations. For
interesting discussion on this topic, the reader is referred to von Fintel (2005) and
Kratzer (2002, 2006).
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(within the context of the situation) for the definite description to pick
up. Thus, the E-type reference problem seems to be solved8.
3.2. The Problem
The preceding discussion, however, contains a henceforth unstated as-
sumption. Namely that, whenever donkey anaphora occurs, an appro-
priate minimal situation that will provide a unique referent is available.
Unfortunately, this is not always the case.
3.2.1. The donkey that lost its fleas
For example, take a world in which there are three farmers (A,B,C),
each of which owns a donkey. Farmers A and B each take good care
of their respective donkeys, grooming them daily. As a result, their
donkeys have no fleas. Farmer C, however, does not groom his donkey,
which has many fleas. This situation is shown in figure 2 below.
own
groom
S1
S1'
own
groom
S2
S2'
have
own
S3
Figure 2. The donkey that lost its fleas
It is pretty uncontroversial that sentence (9) is true in this context
(ignoring causality for the sake of simplicity):
(9) Every farmer who owns a donkey which has no fleas grooms it.
But applying the minimal situation analysis as given above to this
sentence, (9) is false in this scenario.
This can be seen by closely examining figure 2. There are three
situations that involve farmers/donkey pairs (s1, s2, and s3). Note es-
pecially s3, which involves farmer C, his donkey, the owning relationship
between them, but no fleas, nor possession relations between the fleas
and the donkey. s3 conforms to the requirements of being a minimal
situation that contains a farmer who owns a donkey which has no fleas.
8 There are further issues to be addressed as to what happens when a single
farmer owns more than one donkey and similar cases. I refer the reader to Elbourne
(2005) for detailed discussion.
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Due to the denotation of every, every such minimal situation needs to
have an extension wherein the farmer in question (farmer C) grooms the
donkey. However, there is no situation that satisfies that requirement,
and thus the sentence is false.
3.2.2. The donkey hiding out of the situation’s reach
A second manifestation of this problem can be seen in the following
sentence:
(10) Every man who owns a farm beats every donkey in it.
According to the minimal situation analysis as given above, this is a
tautology.
This is because the restriction of the quantifier requires that the
quantification be over minimal situations in which a man own a farm.
These situations obviously do not include any donkeys, as none are
mentioned in the quantifier’s restriction. But every such situation has
many extensions which have nothing to do with donkeys or beatings.
Let us take the scenario given in figure 3 below. In such a scenario, the
sentence intuitively comes out as false, as not all the men beat all the
donkeys in their farm. Specifically, the man in s3 fails to beat one of
the two donkeys in the farm he owns.
own
S1
S1'
Farm
beat
beat ini
n
own
S2
S2'
Farm
beat
beat ini
n
own
S3
S3'
Farm
beat
in
in
Figure 3. The donkey hiding out of the situation’s reach
But note that s3 has an extension s3′ wherein there is only one
donkey, which is beaten by the man in question. Thus, the sentence
is true. Even if the man in question was actually beating none of
the donkeys in his farm, then the sentence would still be true, since
the minimal situation including him and his farm would have many
arbitrary extensions (say, the one including the man, the farm, the
owning relationship, and the man’s hat) that contain no donkeys and
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thus the farmer beats every donkey in them by default. Thus, (10) is
always going to be true9.
3.2.3. What went wrong
There is a clear intuitive notion of what is wrong in these examples.
In (9), The minimal situation that includes farmer C and his donkey
includes no fleas; yet it feels like it should not count as a minimal
situation of a farmer who owns a donkey with no fleas, as the donkey
in question does have fleas outside this situation. In (10), it does not feel
sufficient that for every man/farm pair there is an arbitrary extension
in which all the donkeys in that extension are beaten. Rather, it seems
that the man should beat every donkey in an extension includes all the
donkeys in the farm.
It is here that persistence is needed.
In (9), what is necessary is to quantify over minimal situations that
involve a donkey with no fleas, and are not sub-situations of a situation
for which said donkey has fleas. In (10), it is required that the man beat
every donkey in the farm in the situation in question, and that there be
no extension of that situation in which the farmer doesn’t beat every
donkey in the farm.
Thus, it can be seen that ignoring persistence creates problems for
Elbourne’s framework. The obvious way to correct these problems is to
reintroduce persistence into the equation.
4. Persistence - consequences and implementation
In the previous section, I found some problems for the Heim/Elbourne
analysis of donkey anaphora and suggested that modifying their theory
to ensure persistence will solve these problems. In this section I shall
demonstrate this.
4.1. Persistence and monotonicity
Not all determiners need to have persistence explicitly written into their
denotations. Those that denote quantifiers that are upwards monotone
on both arguments are, in fact, persistent by default.
9 This ignores the possibility that every has an existence presuppositions. If such
a presupposition is reintroduced, then (10) will no longer be a tautology. However,
this does not solve the problem, as the sentence will only require that the man beats
at least one donkey in his farm to be true, so the scenario in figure 3 would still
erroneously validate the sentence.
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To see why monotonicity matters, it is helpful to look at the deno-
tation of a quantifier that does not have persistence written in, such as
the denotation of every given in (3), repeated below as (11):
(11) JeveryK = λf〈〈se〉,〈st〉〉λg〈〈se〉,〈st〉〉λs. For all x〈e〉: if f(λs.x)(s) =
1, g(λs.x)(s) = 1
The quantifier is restricted to entities x that have property f in a
situation s. Because the sub-situation relation ≤ is upwards monotone,
then, assuming that f does not in itself contain any downwards entail-
ing operators, if something has the property f in s it has the property
f in every s′ such that s′ ≤ s. In other words, the set of xs that have
property f in s is a subset of the set of xs that have the property f in
s′.
Thus, going from a situation to an extension of it in essence replaces
the domain argument of the quantifier by a superset of it. This is always
safe if the determiner is upwards monotone in its restriction, but not if
it is downwards or non-monotone in that argument. Parallel reasoning
applies to the nuclear scope of the determiner. This means that if a
determiner is upwards monotone in both arguments, nothing needs to
be added for it to provide persistent quantification10.
4.2. Quantifier monotonicity vs. sentential entailment
It is worth noting that it is the monotonicity of the quantifiers that mat-
ters, rather than the entailment properties of any particular sentence.
For example, note that for (9), the quantifier no fleas is embedded in the
restriction of the quantifier every farmer. This means that the argument
slots of no fleas are actually an upwards entailing environment, as can
be seen from the following inference pattern:
(12) Every farmer who owns a donkey which has no fleas grooms it.
(13) a. ; Every farmer who owns a donkey which has no red fleas
grooms it.
b. ⇒ Every farmer who owns a donkey which has no parasites
grooms it.
Based on this information, one could be led to expect that there should
be no persistence problems associated with the arguments of no. But,
10 It is worth noting that determiners are not the only possible source of down-
wards monotonoicity; negation, negative adverbials, and “negative” predicates such
as lose all are downwards monotone with respect to some of their arguments.
Whether or not these elements include quantification over situations in their de-
notations is a question beyond the scope of this paper. If they do, however, then the
conclusions arrived here will apply to them as well.
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as shown in section 3.2.1, that is incorrect. The reason is that while
entailment is calculated by the sentence as a whole, persistence must
be ensured in embedded propositions as well as matrix ones. (9) can
be paraphrased as the follows:
(14) Every x of which it holds that x is a farmer that owns a
donkey that has no fleas is such that x grooms the relevant
donkey.
For the whole sentence to express a persistent proposition, the bolded
proposition must itself be persistent for each x. If it is not, then going
from a situation to an extension of it may alter the domain of the
matrix quantifiers, by changing whether individual farmers fall under
the restriction or not. This is the nature of the problem in example (9).
Thus, the nature of the embedded quantifier is relevant, even if
ultimately its arguments end up being an upwards entailment envi-
ronment. This shows that the decision in Kratzer (1989) to include
the persistence condition in the denotation of (non-upwards monotone)
quantifiers is the correct way to handle persistence, and I will follow
suit.
4.3. Implementing persistence
Since failures of persistence arise when a proposition that was true in a
small situation fails to be true in a larger one, the best way to prevent
this is to check that the proposition holds in as large a situation as
possible. This is a potential problem, as the Heim/Elbourne solution for
donkey anaphora relies on the presupposition that minimal situations
give unique referents. Can persistence be implemented in a way that
satisfies both demands?
In fact, there is no need to look beyond what was already discussed
to find an implementation that makes this possible. The persistent
quantification in Kratzer (1989) adds a condition that the individuals
quantified must satisfy the restriction of a quantifier in the largest
situation available (i.e., the entire world) in addition to the situation
quantified over. This denotation allows checking persistence against the
maximal situation w, while at the same time the actual quantification
remains on truly minimal situations. Thus, the best of both worlds
has apparently been achieved, at least as far as using situations to
account for donkey anaphora. Adding such a condition to Elbourne’s
every results in the following:
(15) Persistent minimal quantification:JeveryK= λf〈〈se〉,〈st〉〉λg〈〈se〉,〈st〉〉λs1. For every x〈e〉: if f(λs.x)(w)
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= 1, then f(λs.x)(s1) = 1 and for every minimal situation s2
such that s2 ≤ s1 and f(λs.x)(s2) = 1, there is a situation
s3 such that s3 ≤ s1 and s3 is a minimal situation such that
s2 ≤ s3 and g(λs.x)(s3) = 1
This denotation of every (and a similarly modified denotation for no)
would avoid both of the problems for Elbourne’s system. In the case of
the donkey that lost its fleas, the reasoning is simple: farmer C is not
a farmer who owns a donkey with no fleas in w, and thus does not fall
under the domain of quantification. The other problem is a bit more
complex: the matrix every quantifies over all the men in w that own
a farm, and for each minimal situation that includes such a pairing, it
states that there is an extension wherein every donkey in the farm is
beaten. So far, the persistence makes no difference. But the embedded
every now quantifies over every entity in w that is a donkey in the
farm in the relevant minimal situation, rather than just those donkeys
that are present in an arbitrary situation. Thus, no donkeys can escape
notice.
But this denotation is only possible under the assumption that refer-
ence to w in a determiner denotation is unproblematic. In the following
section, it shall be shown that this does not fit comfortably with other
recent uses of situation semantics.
5. Persistence and contextual restriction
One property of persistent quantification as discussed so far is that it is
global; every quantifier in some sense quantifies over the whole world.
If nothing further is said, this leads to strange-looking predictions.
Take the following sentence, for example:
(16) Every tree is laden with wonderful apples.
By global persistence, (16) would only be true if every tree in the entire
world is laden with wonderful apples. Kratzer (1989) solves this by ap-
pealing to contextual domain restriction to fill in additional descriptive
material. According to her, (16) really should be given a reading along
the lines of the following:
(17) Every tree [in my orchard] is laden with wonderful apples.
This is an intuitively appealing notion, as it is a well-established fact
that contextual restriction must come into play in exactly these sen-
tences anyway. However, the viability of this option depends heavily on
the way in which contextual restriction is implemented. While Kratzer
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(1989) does not provide an actual theory of contextual restriction, she
is clear that this must be done by an additional mechanism rather
than then the situations themselves, explicitly rejecting the theory of
contextual restriction provided in Barwise and Perry (1983) because it
relies on non-persistent propositions.
5.1. Contextual restriction via topic situations
In contrast to her earlier position, Kratzer (2004) proposes that con-
textual restriction should be accounted for not by adding descriptive
material to the sentence, but rather by applying the proposition in
question to a topic situation, which contains only the contextually
relevant entities.
According to Kratzer, utterances in context represent an Austinian
proposition (after Austin, 1950) - that is, a pairing of a topic sit-
uation and a proposition <s, p>. An assertion operator assert is
responsible for applying the topic situation as a situation argument for
the proposition (i.e., the one required by the λs of the highest scope
operator)
(18) JassertK(<s, p>) = p(s)
Since every embedded operator is passed a situation variable by the
next higher operator which is a sub-situation of the situation param-
eter of that operator, this ensures that all quantifiers are restricted to
elements of the topic situation.
Put differently, this system relies on the principle that each operator
only has access to the situation that the operator above gives it, and
can only pass down parts of that situation to lower operators. This,
indeed, recaptures one of the intuitive uses of situations; they are used
in order to talk about just part of the world11.
This principle would be nullified if direct reference to w is allowed,
such as used above to ensure persistence. Doing so allows a quantifier
to see information that was not strictly passed down to it by a higher
operator. For example, imagine the following scenario: yesterday, a
semantics exam was graded. Exactly one student got a B; surprisingly,
she did so without making any actual errors, but just by failing to
answer questions in a satisfactory manner. (19) is true in this scenario:
11 Note that Kratzer (2004) does not specifically rule out an additional mechanism
for contextual restriction. In fact, she argues that such a mechanism must exist for
restrictions that are based on cultural conventions. But for the purposes of this
paper, what is important is that normal contextual restriction, i.e. the kind that
determines the relevant apples for the use of every apples in (16), is handled via
topic situations.
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(19) Some student who made no errors got a B.
(19) requires the existence of a student who made no mistakes in the
relevant context - i.e., on her semantics exam. It will not be falsified if
that same student made an error in her phonology exam.
However, if persistence is checked relative to the world, then the
error on the phonology exam will be enough to remove the student
from the domain of quantification (for there are errors in w which she
made), thus falsifying the sentence12.
5.1.1. Local persistence
Accepting the theory of contextual restriction in Kratzer (2004), then,
means that a different way of implementing persistence is necessary:
one wherein persistence is local to the situation which the quantifier
received as an argument.
Note that, if minimal situations are ignored, local persistence actu-
ally comes for free in Kratzer (1989). The denotation of every given in
(3) (repeated below as (20)) is only problematic as far as persistence
is concerned because the situation argument a given sentence takes
would often be smaller than the entire world, which was the global
level up to which persistence was desired. If, following Kratzer (2004),
this situation variable is taken to always reflect the contextual domain
wherein persistence needs to hold, (3) (repeated as (20)) will suffice.
(20) JeveryK = λf〈〈se〉,〈st〉〉λg〈〈se〉,〈st〉〉λs. For all x〈e〉: if f(λs.x)(s) =
1, g(λs.x)(s) = 1
In the Heim/Elbourne system, however, things are not so simple. The
first problem is that having the property specified in the restriction is
only checked in a minimal situation, not in the actual contextual situa-
tion. This can be solved with a minimal modification of (15), replacing
12 One possible objection at this point is that the sentence is true even in the larger
situation because of implicit anaphora within it; in other words, that the sentence
really means:
(i) Some student who made no errors in an exam got a B in that exam.
While accounting for this covert anaphora is an interesting problem in its own right,
it does not allow the sentence to apply to a wider situation. To see this, instead of
the scenario above imagine that the only student who made no errors in semantics
got an A in that exam. At the same time, she also made no errors in phonology,
yet got a B in phonology regardless. If I were to utter (19) while I was discussing
the grading of the semantics exam, the sentence would be false. Thus, the anaphora
effect on its own is insufficient as a means to rescue persistence checked relative to
the world.
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the reference to w with reference to every ’s situation parameter s1, as
follows:
(21) Locally persistent minimal quantification:JeveryK= λf〈〈se〉,〈st〉〉λg〈〈se〉,〈st〉〉λs1. For every x〈e〉: if f(λs.x)(s1)
= 1, then for every minimal situation s2 such that s2 ≤ s1 and
f(λs.x)(s2) = 1, there is a situation s3 such that s3 ≤ s1 and
s3 is a minimal situation such that s2 ≤ s3 and g(λs.x)(s3) =
1
(21) can handle the problem of the disappearing fleas as well as (15) can.
Simply put, it is not sufficient that a minimal situation can be found
that contains a farmer, his donkey, and no fleas, it is also necessary that
he has no fleas in the context situation. This is all that is necessary to
get the correct reading for that sentence.
However, there is a second problem. Unlike in the simple case of (3),
in the minimal situation-based theory embedded quantifiers no longer
have access to everything in the topic situation, but only have access to
what is in the situation passed down to them from the higher quantifier,
as desired. This, unfortunately, reintroduces the other problem. To see
this, lets return to (10), repeated as (22):
(22) Every farmer who owns a farm beats every donkey in it.
As before, the minimal situation (call it sfarm) in which a farmer x
owns a farm contains no donkeys. Now take an arbitrary extension
(sfarm+) of that situation, such that sfarm+ contains no donkeys. By
the definition of the quantifier, it is now necessary to check whether
beats every donkey in it is true of x in sfarm+. This involves passing
sfarm+ as the situation parameter of the embedded quantifier every.
This is the largest situation which the persistence condition of every
can see. But there are no donkeys in the farm in sfarm+. Thus, the
persistence condition is toothless in this scenario.
Thus, domain restriction that relies on situations variables being
passed down from one operator to the next prevents using persistence
to solve the problem of elements hiding outside minimal situations.
5.1.2. Possible alternatives
Other methods of using situations for domain restriction may not suffer
from this problem:
One possible solution is to claim that the topic situation is always
available for direct reference in a discourse. Thus, it is possible to use
the definition in (15), simply replacing the reference to w with stopic:
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(23) Locally persistent minimal quantification (alternative):JeveryK = λf〈〈se〉,〈st〉〉λg〈〈se〉,〈st〉〉λs1. For every x〈e〉:
if f(λs.x)(stopic) = 1, then f(λs.x)(s1) = 1 and for every min-
imal situation s2 such that s2 ≤ s1 and f(λs.x)(s2) = 1, there
is a situation s3 such that s3 ≤ s1 and s3 is a minimal situation
such that s2 ≤ s3 and g(λs.x)(s3) = 1
Another possibility, raised by Recanati (2004), is that topic situations
are not used to saturate a situation argument slot, but rather are
added as a form of semantic enrichment. Such a system would differ
enough from Kratzer (2004) that the results above would not necessar-
ily hold for it (though other problems may well rise, based on the exact
implementation).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I explored the notion of persistence and have shown that
the form in which it is implemented has crucial consequences for the
applications of situation semantics in linguistics. While it is debatable
whether a global implementation of persistence, wherein it holds all
the way up to the entire world, is necessary, some form of persistence is
needed to avoid information “leakage” between embedded quantifiers
and the quantifiers scoping over them. One example of such a problem,
which arises in the system of Elbourne (2005), was described.
Attempting to solve this problems taught us more about the nature
of persistence and how it interacts with minimal situations. Along the
way it was shown that implementing a persistent minimal situations
approach to donkeys is impossible if the contextual restriction method
proposed in Kratzer (2004) is also used. This incompatibility goes
unnoticed if persistence is ignored.
Situtation semantics are a powerful tool because they allow access
to, and quantification over, parts of worlds, thus allowing information
to be partitioned into chunks of the correct granularity for various se-
mantic application. However, this tool arrives with a cost, since without
care it is easy to lose important information along the way, arriving at
incorrect results. Persistence is important in that it controls the flow of
information between different levels of embedding in a sentence. While,
with sufficient care, it may be possible to write a situation semantics
(for a situation semantics fragment) that does not use persistence,
simply ignoring it will likely result in hidden flaws in the system.
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